His unit had been attacked six times a day. They had to go around in Warriors (armoured vehicles)all the time. They had very little social contact with the locals.

He said that there could be a fight between two tribes over the ownership of a cow. In the course of this, 17 people could be killed. Would the British army intervene in this, I asked? Yes, he said. It was part of their mandate. This 'peacekeeping' mandate was drawn up by politicians who do not work on the ground.

The commander did not say this, but it is clear that if the British army did not intervene in such circumstances, there would be bloodshed between two tribes which would then continue to hate each other. But as it does intervene - and often kills people in the process and leaves neither side satisfied or feeling that justice has been done - both the two tribes come to hate the British army.

It is a recipe for getting hated.

It is also very different from what I understand to have been the strategy during the Malay insurgency. I believe that then a British soldier was assigned to each village and lived there with the locals. He would get to know them well and they would get to know and respect him. If the village was attacked by rebels, he could summon aid. He was likely to be seen as being on the side of the locals. That tactic may not be appropriate in Iraq. But what a big contrast there is between Malaya and Iraq. In Malaya, we had a chance of winning 'hearts and minds'. The way things are going in Iraq now, we seem to have no chance of that at all.